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Abstract 
Systems-of-systems (SoS) like the air transportation system and missile defense are gaining increasing attention in both the 
academic and practitioner communities. This research investigates one crucial aspect of SoSs: their ability to recover from 
disruptions, or their resilience. We develop a family of system importance measures (SIMs) that rank the constituent systems 
based on their impact on the overall SoS performance. The SIMs address some of the major weaknesses that have prevented 
researchers from identifying a single resilience metric. While trade-space analyses are standard practice in systems engineering, 
conducting trades on SoS resilience is difficult because, to date, no reliable and consistent metrics have been developed for SoS 
resilience. Some metrics have been proposed, but these measures assume homogenous networks, thus ignoring one of the key 
features of SoSs: the combination of heterogeneous systems (e.g., airports and aircraft) to achieve a common goal (e.g., 
transport). Instead of focusing on an overall metric, the set of SIMs provides designers with specific information on where an 
SoS is lacking resilience (or has excess resilience) and hence on where improvements are needed (or where downgrades are 
possible). 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the University of Southern California. 
Keywords: Resilience, system-of-systems, importance measures  
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-765-464-4966; fax: +1-765-494-0307. 
E-mail address: puday@purdue.edu 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the University of Southern California.
258   Payuna Uday and Karen B. Marais /  Procedia Computer Science  28 ( 2014 )  257 – 264 
1. Introduction 
All systems are subject to change over their lifetimes. Resilience is the ability of a system to survive and recover 
from these changes. Implementing resilience is a challenging task because it is highly context-dependent. Systems 
may be resilient to certain types of disturbances but vulnerable to others. Long-lasting systems, such as infrastructure 
networks (e.g., energy, transportation, or communications), may initially be resilient to certain disruptions, but as 
time passes after systems are fielded, changes in the operating environment may make the networks less resilient to 
both old and new types of threats. Once a failure occurs, resilience is the inherent ability of a system to survive and 
recover from this disturbance. And so, resilience is represented as a combination of survivability and recoverability, 
as shown in Fig. 1. This notional representation is widely used in the literature1,2,3 to depict the fundamental ideas 
behind resilience. While it appears easy to represent resilience conceptually, it is much harder to define, assess, and 
design resilient systems. 
A system-of-systems (SoS) is a large-scale integrated network of systems that are heterogeneous and 
independently operable on their own, but collaborate for a common goal. For example, the national air space (NAS) 
and the national highway systems are SoSs. While trade-space analyses are standard practice in systems 
engineering, conducting trades on SoS resilience is difficult because, to date, no reliable and consistent metrics have 
been developed for SoS resilience. Several metrics have been proposed, but these measures assume homogenous 
networks, ignoring one of the key features of SoS: the combination of heterogeneous systems (e.g., airports and 
aircraft) to achieve a common goal (e.g., transport). Rather than attempting to create a single metric that glosses 
over the complexities of an SoS, we present here a family of System Importance Measures (SIMs) that capture 
different aspects of SoS resilience. Analogous to component importance measures in reliability theory, the SIMs 
provide a way to rank or prioritize the constituent systems of an SoS based on different threats. Specifically, these 
SIMs provide analysts and designers with informative guidance on where an SoS is lacking resilience (or has excess 
resilience) and hence on where improvements are needed (or where downgrades are possible). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Notional SoS resilience following a disruption 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes two System Importance Measures 
(SIMs) and presents the mathematical formulation behind these metrics. Section 3 demonstrates the use of these two 
SIMs with illustrative examples. Section 4 presents two additional System Importance Metrics. And, finally Section 
5 concludes the paper.  
2. System Importance Measures 
Measuring resilience is a critical first step in any framework that aims at addressing or improving resilience. 
However, establishing a single, all-encompassing resilience metric will be challenging, if not impossible. Since a 
two-dimensional representation of resilience (see Fig. 1) is necessary to capture the main aspects of this attribute, a 
single metric to measure resilience could be insufficient. Given the two dimensions (time and performance), there 
will always exist cases where a single-dimensional metric will yield the same result for two different curves. For 
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example, such a metric would not distinguish between a curve with a quick recovery to low performance gain and 
one with a slow recovery to a high performance gain. Further, while a single overall metric may enable overall 
comparisons between different SoS architectures, such a metric provides little, if any, information regarding specific 
areas within each SoS that need attention. To address this gap, our research develops a family of System Importance 
Measures (SIMs) that captures different aspects (time and performance) of and contributors to SoS resilience. 
Analogous to Component Importance Measures (CIMs) in reliability theory, SIMs provide a way to rank the 
constituent systems of an SoS based on their impact on the overall SoS performance during disruptions. 
Component importance measures4,5,6,7 combine system structure and component reliability to assess the 
importance of a particular component to the overall reliability. They indicate, for example, whether improving a 
particular component will improve the overall reliability, or, conversely, if a compoent can be downgraded without 
significantly impacting the overall system reliability. CIMs include Birnbaum’s measure, risk achievement worth, 
risk reduction worth, and Fussell-Vesely’s measure.  
There have been a few attempts to modify the component importance measures to analyze the resilience of 
networks. Barker et al.8 developed two resilience-based CIMs for networks, but the analysis and subsequent metrics 
are only applicable to networks with homogenous nodes. In addition, emphasis is placed on network flow (that is 
link resilience) rather than to nodes. While this approach may be beneficial in addressing network resilience, it 
appears to be useful only for networks where the flow between mostly similar nodes is of concern rather than 
particular functions carried out at the nodes themselves. 
Our work focuses on developing importance measures specifically for SoS that are characterized by diversity in 
nodes and functions. Similar to the CIMs described above, system importance measures help identify and rank the 
systems that have the most and least impact on the overall SoS resilience. Consider Fig. 2. Once a constituent 
system, say System i, fails, the performance of the SoS drops from its nominal performance level to some degraded 
level. In the absence of any recovery measure, the SoS performance stays at this lower level for the duration of the 
disruption, till the failed system is repaired or replaced. However, if some recovery measure is employed, such as 
having another System j take over some of the lost functionality, then the SoS performance is raised to a higher level 
of performance (between the nominal and degraded level) and stays at this level till the original failure been 
addressed and overall performance is brought back to the nominal level. Our measures capture both the impact on 
the SoS of system failures, as well as the importance of using systems to recover SoS performance.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Resilience curve indicating failed System i and recovery System j (for SRI and SDI analysis) 
We use the resilience curve to develop four system importance measures: (1) System Recoverability Importance, 
(2) System Disruption Importance, (3) System Recovery Time Importance, and (4) System Performance 
Importance. We discuss the first two SIMs in this section and demonstrate their applicability using illustrative 
examples in the following section. In Section 4, we present current work on developing the next two SIMs. 
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2.1. System Recoverability Importance (SRI) 
The first measure, System Recoverability Importance (SRI), answers the question: How important is a system to 
SoS recovery? Thus, SRIi,j measures how important System j is to SoS recovery when System i fails. Based on Fig. 
2, we define SRIi,j as: 
 
 ܴܵܫ௜ǡ௝ ൌ
݃ݎ݁ݕ ܽݎ݁ܽ
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽሺ݃ݎ݁ݕ ൅ ݀݋ݐݐ݁݀ሻ ܽݎ݁ܽ
 (1) 
 
 ܧ൫ܴܵܫ௜ǡ௝൯ ൌ ܴܵܫ௜ǡ௝Ǥ ௔ܲ௩௔௜௟ሺ݆ሻ (2) 
 
The larger the value of SRIi,j, the more important the System j is to mitigating any disruption impact on the SoS 
due to the failure of System i. Now, SRIi,j depends on the availability of System j to actually provide this recovery. 
Hence, the expected SRIi,j is calculated using equation (2). The summation of these expected SRIi,j values yields the 
overall contribution of System j to SoS recoverability. Specifically, σ ܧሺܴܵܫ௜ǡ௝ሻ௡௜ୀଵ  indicates how important System j 
is to overall SoS recovery when the other systems fail. 
2.2. System Disruption Importance (SDI) 
The second measure, System Disruption Importance (SDI), answers the question: What is the impact of a system 
failure on the overall SoS? Thus, SDIi,j measures the impact of the failure of System i, given the ability of System j 
to provide recovery, on the overall SoS performance. Again using Fig. 2, SDIi,j is given by:  
 
 
ܵܦܫ௜ǡ௝ ൌ
݀݋ݐݐ݁݀ ܽݎ݁ܽ
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽሺ݃ݎ݁ݕ ൅ ݀݋ݐݐ݁݀ሻ ܽݎ݁ܽ
 
(3) 
 
 ܧ൫ܵܦܫ௜ǡ௝൯ ൌ ௙ܲ௔௜௟ሺ݅ȁܦሻǤ ܵܦܫ௜ǡ௝Ǥ ௔ܲ௩௔௜௟ሺ݆ሻ (4) 
 
Thus, a high value of SDIi,j represents high importance of System i since the recovery measure does not 
adequately reduce the impact of the disruption on the SoS. Now, SDIi,j depends on: (a) the conditional probability 
that System i fails given a disruption D occurs, and (b) the availability of System j to actually provide this recovery. 
Hence, the expected SDIi,j is calculated using equation (4). The summation of these expected SDIi,j values yields the 
overall expected impact of a disruption on the SoS when System i fails. Specifically, σ ܧሺܴܵܫ௜ǡ௝ሻ௡௝ୀଵ  indicates the 
impact of System i failure, given that other systems are available for recovery, on the overall SoS. 
3. Application of SRI and SDI: Illustrative Example 
 
Fig. 3. Four-node notional SoS 
Consider a simple four-node SoS (see Fig. 3). Each constituent system performs one or more functions, and 
collaborations between these systems enable higher SoS-level capabilities. The failure of each constituent system 
results in a corresponding drop in SoS performance from 100% to some degraded level. This degraded level 
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depends on the failed system as shown in Table 1. We assume that, in the absence of any resilience capability, the 
SoS performance level is raised from the degraded level to 100% only by the repair or replacement of the failed 
system. 
We now apply the SRI and SDI to analyze two cases of SoS resilience: (1) stand-by redundancy, and (b) stand-in 
redundancy. Stand-by redundancy is the traditional technique of having an identical secondary system, called a 
“back-up”, on stand-by for each constituent system. So, if a system fails, the SoS performance level drops to the 
corresponding degraded level for a small (10% of total disruption time for each system) duration of time before the 
back-up raises the performance level back to 100%. 
   Table 1. Impact of system failures on SoS (baseline case with no resilience measures available) 
Failed system Degraded SoS performance level Time duration of failure 
System 1 50% 20 units 
System 2 30% 30 units 
System 3 10% 10 units 
System 4 20% 50 units 
 
On the other hand, stand-in redundancy is a way to compensate for a loss of performance in one constituent 
system by re-tasking the remaining systems. Specifically, as one entity, or node in an SoS, experiences degraded 
performance or a failure mode, other entities can alter their operations to compensate for this loss. In the four-node 
example SoS, stand-in redundancy is implemented as follows:  
x When System 1 fails, Systems 2 and 3 can enable partial recovery as follows: System 2 raises the performance 
level to 75% after 10 time units, while System 3 raises the SoS performance level to 55% after 5 time units; 
x When System 2 fails Systems 1 and 4 can enable partial recovery as follows: System 1 raises the performance 
level to 90% after 5 time units, while System 4 raises the SoS performance level to 40% after 10 time units; 
x When System 3 fails, Systems 1 and 2 can enable partial recovery as follows: System 1 raises the performance 
level to 80% after 2 time units, while System 2 raises the SoS performance level to 65% after 5 time units; and 
x When System 4 fails, only System 3 can raise the SoS performance level to 65% after 40 time units 
Table 2 shows the probabilities used to compute the expected values of SRIi,j and SDIi,j. The probability that each 
back-up system (1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b) is available is 1 (not shown in table).  
      Table 2. (Pfail|D) and Pavail for Systems 1, 2, 3, and 4 
System Probability system fails given disruption D occurs (Pfail|D) 
Probability system is available to stand-in for 
failed functions (Pavail) 
System 1 0.6 0.99 
System 2 0.5 0.98 
System 3 0.02 0.90 
System 4 0.01 0.99 
3.1. Analysis of stand-by redundancy 
Fig. 4 shows the results of applying SRI and SDI metrics to the stand-by case. The rows of this figure indicate the 
system that has failed and the columns represent the systems that are used for recovery. In the stand-by situation, the 
failure of each system can only be compensated for by the use of its corresponding back-up. Thus, when System 1 
fails, only System 1b can provide recovery; when System 2 fails only System 2b can provide recovery; and so on. 
Wherever applicable, each cell in the matrix comprises a set of values in parenthesis (E(SRIi,j), E(SDIi,j)). These 
values are calculated using equations (2) and (4). Summing the expected SRIi,j values along each column, and then 
normalizing them with the maximum expected recoverability for each column, provides the expected contribution of 
the back-up systems to overall SoS recoverability. A high value indicates that the system contributes significantly to 
recovery when other systems fail, and conversely, a low value indicates that the system does not impact overall SoS 
recovery.  
Similarly, summing the expected SDIi,j values and normalizing them along each row gives the overall expected 
impact of a failure, in the presence of a back-up, on the SoS. Here, a high value indicates that the SoS is impacted 
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severely by the loss of the corresponding system, while a low value indicates that the system failure has a low 
impact on the SoS. The back-up systems have a high contribution to the overall recoverability, however this 
contribution is possible only when the corresponding primary system fails. Also, given the presence of these (costly) 
back-up systems, the overall impact of failures on the SoS is very low. 
 
 
Fig. 4. SRI and SDI for stand-by redundancy 
3.2. Analysis of stand-in redundancy 
Fig. 5 shows the results of applying SRI and SDI metrics to the stand-in case. The rows of this figure indicate the 
system that has failed and the columns represent the systems that are used for recovery. As explained previously, in 
the stand-in situation, the failure of each system can only be compensated for re-tasking other systems in the SoS 
Here too, wherever applicable, each cell in the matrix comprises a set of values in parenthesis (E(SRIi,j), E(SDIi,j)), 
calculated using equations (2) and (4). Summing and normalizing the expected SRIi,j values along each column 
provides the expected contribution of each system to overall SoS recoverability. System 1 plays a key role in 
recoverability as it can provide substantial recovery when Systems 2 or 3 fail. On the other hand, Systems 3 and 4 
are not useful to recovery. Although System 3 can stand-in partially when Systems 1 or 4 fail, the actual amount of 
recovery it provides is very low.  
Summing and normalizing the expected SDIi,j values along each row provides the overall expected impact of a 
failure, in the presence of a back-up, on the SoS. Failure of System 1 has a relatively large impact on the SoS, while 
failure of Systems 3 and 4 do not impact the SoS significantly. Unlike the expected SRIi,j values, the expected SDIi,j 
depends on the probability that a system will actually fail. From Table 2 we know that the probability of failure for 
Systems 3 and 4 are low. As a result, even though the recovery measures in place for when these two systems fail 
are inadequate, the impact of their failures on the overall SoS is low.  
These initial results demonstrate the use of SIMs in the analysis and design of resilient SoSs: 
1. Using these importance measures, we are able to determine which areas of the SoS have excess or inadequate 
resilience. While an overall metric could provide some estimate of SoS resilience under both stand-in and 
stand-by redundancy cases, these SIMs provide specific information about: (a) systems that have excess 
recoverability, and (b) systems that have inadequate recoverability and hence, need more attention (resources). 
2. SIMs also provide specific information to guide design decisions. For example, the results showed which type 
of redundancy proved better for each system. Specifically considering the expected SDIi,j values for stand-by 
and stand-in cases, we see that failure of Systems 3 or 4 has marginally higher impact on the SoS when stand-in 
redundancy is employed instead of stand-by redundancy. If these systems are expensive to back-up, then 
incurring a slightly higher initial investment in enabling other systems to perform some of System 3 and 4’s 
functions may be a more cost-effective option to achieve essentially the same level of resilience. This 
observation highlights the importance of cost implications in resilience analyses. Future work will incorporate 
financial considerations with these SIMs to guide design decisions. 
 
System used for recovery 
Failed 
system 
System 1b System 2b System 3b System 4b 
System 1 (0.9, 0.06) 0 0 0 
System 2 0 (0.9, 0.05) 0 0 
System 3 0 0 (0.9, 0.002) 0 
System 4 0 0 0 (0.9, 0.001) 
0.06 
0.05 
0.002 
0.001 
SDIi, jj 1
4
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 SRIi, ji 1
4
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Fig. 5. SRI and SDI for stand-in redundancy 
4. Additional System Importance Measures 
The SRI and SDI do not place a relative value on time versus performance. The resilience curves for a system 
that provides a rapid, but low recovery, and a system that provides a slower, but greater recovery can have the same 
SRI and SDI values. To explicitly account for how fast a system can provide recovery as well as how much 
performance gain can be obtained, we present two additional SIMs: (a) System Recovery Time Importance, and (b) 
System Performance Importance. We briefly present the mathematical formulation of these measures here. Their 
application is left for future work. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Resilience curve indicating failed System i and recovery System j for (a) SRTI analysis and (b) SPI analysis 
4.1. System Recovery Time Importance (SRTI) 
System Recovery Time Importance answers the question: How important is a system in terms of how rapidly it 
can provide SoS recovery? Based on Fig. 6(a), SRTIi,j is given by equation (5). The larger the value of SRTIi,j, the 
faster System j is able to recover some of the lost functionality. Similar to the expected value of SRIi,j, SRTIi,j also 
depends on the availability of System j to actually provide this recovery. Hence, the expected SRTIi,j is calculated 
using equation (6). Similar to the SRI measure, the summation of these expected SRTIi,j values yields the overall 
contribution of System j to SoS recovery time. 
 
 ܴܵܶܫ௜ǡ௝ ൌ
݃ݎ݁ݕ ܽݎ݁ܽ
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽሺ݃ݎ݁ݕ ൅ ݀݋ݐݐ݁݀ሻ ܽݎ݁ܽ
 (5) 
 
 ܧ൫ܴܵܶܫ௜ǡ௝൯ ൌ ܴܵܶܫ௜ǡ௝Ǥ ௔ܲ௩௔௜௟ሺ݆ሻ (6) 
System used for recovery 
Failed 
system 
System 1 System 2 System 3 System 4 
System 1 (0,0) (0.2450, 0.4410) (0.0675, 0.4995) (0,0) 
System 2 (0.7071, 0.1414) (0,0) (0,0) (0.0943, 0.4479) 
System 3 (0.6160, 0.0075) (0.2994, 0.0136) (0,0) (0,0) 
System 4 (0,0) (0,0) (0.1013, 0.0080) (0,0) 
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4.2. System Performance Importance (SPI) 
System Performance Importance answers the question: How important is a system in terms of how much SoS 
performance gain it can provide? Based on Fig. 6(b), SPIi,j is given by equation (7). The larger the value of SPIi,j, the 
higher the performance gain that System j is able to provide. Similar to the expected value of STRIi,j, SPIi,j also 
depends on the availability of System j to actually provide this recovery. Hence, the expected SPIi,j is calculated 
using equation (8). And so, the summation of these expected SPIi,j values yields the overall contribution of System j 
to SoS performance recovery. 
 
 ܵܲܫ௜ǡ௝ ൌ
݃ݎ݁ݕ ܽݎ݁ܽ
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽሺ݃ݎ݁ݕ ൅ ݀݋ݐݐ݁݀ሻ ܽݎ݁ܽ
 (7) 
 
 ܧ൫ܵܲܫ௜ǡ௝൯ ൌ ܵܲܫ௜ǡ௝Ǥ ௔ܲ௩௔௜௟ሺ݆ሻ (8) 
4. Conclusion and Future Work 
The primary aim of this research is to provide a rigorous quantitative basis to make informed decisions about SoS 
resilience as opposed to the existing ad-hoc approaches. We suggest System Importance Measures (SIMs) as one 
way to analyze resilience with a focus on ranking resilience-critical systems. We first presented the mathematical 
formulation behind these SIMs, and then demonstrated their use with two cases. In future work, we will refine this 
initial formulation and expand it to a framework that evaluates resilience-cost trade-offs and provides guidance on 
designing SoS resilience. Specifically, this research will help identify areas in the SoS where greater investment of 
resources will considerably improve the resilience of the overall SoS, or conversely, areas where additional capital 
need not be spent, as these systems do not significantly impact the overall SoS. In current work, we are also 
applying these importance measures to a study of the Littoral Combat Ship SoS.  
The key contribution of this research is to provide decision-makers with improved information and tools to make 
SoS-level decisions. The use of system importance measures (SIMs), and their resulting upstream effects on 
development policies, costs and risks, can be used by decision-makers to quantitatively assess the resilience of SoSs 
and by designers to better allocate risk resolution resources.  
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